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REASONABLE MISTAKE OF AGE: A NEEDED 
DEFENSE TO STATUTORY RAPE 
Larry W. Myers* 
[T]o a defence that the accused had no idea and knew nothing about it ••• the 
Mikado replied: "That's the pathetic part of it. Unfortunately, the fool of an Act 
says ••• not a word about a mistake, or not knowing, or having no notion • • • • 
There should be, of course, but there isn't. That's the slovenly way in which these 
Acts are drawn." 
GILBERT & SULLIVAN, The Mikado 
I. STRICT LIABILITY: A CASE OF MISGUIDED MORALITY 
T HE time has come for more liberal and realistic laws regarding statutory rape. Men of literature have historically recognized that 
corporal appearances are not necessarily a precise index of the age of 
their bearer and that it is a natural inclination for youths to strive to 
appear older than they are and to pursue activities generally thought 
to be beyond the capacity of persons in their particular age group.1 
More recently, behavioral scientists have confirmed these facts of life.2 
Thus, notwithstanding the relatively close correlation between a per-
son's physical age and his level of sophistication, these social realities 
indicate that the selection of any particular "age of consent" in statu-
tory rape laws must necessarily be an arbitrary determination and, 
, therefore, susceptible to reasonable mistakes of fact. Nevertheless, 
evidence to this effect has traditionally been rejected by the courts, 
and the nearly uniform holding, in cases involving statutory rape, 
has been that mistake as to the age of the female is no defense,8 
regardless of the honesty and reasonableness of the mistaken belief.4 
• Member of the Nebraska Bar~Ed. 
1. "When we are young, we long to tread a way none trod before." YEATS, THE 
LAND OF HEAR.T's DESIRE; "Youth is wholly experimental." STEVENSON, A LETrER. TO A 
YOUNG GENTLEMAN; "My salad days, when I was· green in judgment." SHAKESPEAllE, 
ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA, Act 1, Scene 5, Line 73; "When the brisk minor pants for 
twenty-one." POPE, EPISTLE 1, Book 1, Line 38; "This age of ours should not be 
numbered by years, dates, and hours." GuII.LAUME DE SALLUSTE, DIVINE WEEKS AND 
WoRKS, Second Week, Fourth Day, Book 2; "Old time is a liar .••• Young men are 
fitter to invent than to judge, fitter for execution than for counsel •••• " HOLMES, THE 
BOYS. 
2. See KINSEY lNSl'lTUTE FOil SEX RESEARCH, SEX OFFENDERS 83-85 (1965) [hereinafter 
cited as SEX OFFENDERS]. 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1941); United States 
v. Maclc, 112 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1940); Manship v. People, 99 Colo. 1, 58 P.2d 1215 
(1936); Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 10 So. 2d 436 (1942); State v. Duncan, 82 Mont. 
170, 266 Pac. 400 (1928); State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314- (1945); Reid v. 
State, 290 P.2d 775 (Okla. Crim. 1955); Commonwealth v. Sarricks, 161 Pa. Super. 577, 
56 A.2d 323 (1948); Smith v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 438, 272 S.W .2d 104 (1954); State 
v. Adkins, 106 W. Va. 658, 146 S.E. 732 (1929). 
4. Miller v. State, 16 Ala. App. 534, 79 So. 314 (1918); People v. Marks, 146 App. 
Div. 11, 130 N.Y.S. 524 (1911). 
[105] 
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This unfortunate result has prevailed despite the fact that the 
defendant's judgment regarding the age of the prosecutrix frequently 
appears to be warranted by her appearance, 11 her verbal misrepresen-
tations, 6 the environmental facts,7 or even the defendant's careful and 
diligent attempts to ascertain her true age.8 On grounds of public 
policy, coitus with any under-age female has been deemed punishable 
without proof that the defendant knew the facts which gave to his act 
the character of statutory rape. The element of criminal intent, 
although technically not eliminated, has been deemed to be em-
bodied in the defendant's decision to proceed "at his peril."0 This 
irrational doctrine is now so generally accepted that many American 
courts have not been asked to rule on the question of reasonable mis• 
take of age for over half a century.10 Moreover, recent decisions by the 
highest tribunals of Alaska and Hawaii have reaffirmed the dogmatic 
judicial adherence to the doctrine.11 
It is important to note, however, that the treatment of this im-
portant issue in American law is in sharp contrast to its treatment in 
European law, which has long and steadfastly upheld mistake of age 
as a defense to statutory rape.12 Indeed, even the suggestion of strict 
liability in the area of statutory rape has occasioned the vociferous 
and continued criticism of Continental analysts and legal philoso-
phers.13 The imposition of criminal sanctions in the absence of any 
5. People v. Gengels, 218 Mich. 632, 188 N.W. 398 (1922); Elkins v. State, 167 Tenn. 
546, 72 S.W .2d 550 (1934); Greene v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. 52, 273 S.W. 853 (1925). 
6. People v. Lewellyn, 314 Ill. 106, 145 N.E. 289 (1924); Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 
296, 90 N.E. 310 (1910); Farrell v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 488, 215 S.W .2d 625 (1948); 
Zachary v. State, 57 Tex. Crim. 179, 122 S.W. 289 (1909). 
7. State v. Bums, 82 Conn. 213, 72 Atl. 1083 (1909); State v. Duncan, 82 Mont. 170, 
226 Pac. 400 (1928); State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629 (Mo. 1923); State v. Rash, Zl S.D. 
185, 130 N.W. 91 (1911). 
8. Manning v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 302, 65 S.W. 920 (1901). 
9. Askew v. State, us So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1960). See also BISHOP, STATUTORY CRIMES 
§ 490 (2d ed. 1883): "His intent to violate the laws of morality and the good order 
of society, though with the consent of the girl, and though in a case where he 
supposes he shall escape punishment, satisfies the demands of the law, and he must 
take the consequences." 
10. The following representative decisions reveal the antiquity of this rule: Heath 
v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (1909); State v. Sherman, 106 Iowa 684, 77 N.W. 461 
(1898); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896); State v. Howe, 
109 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1892); Zent v. State, 3 Ohio App. 473 (1914); Lawrence v. 
Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Grat.) 845 (1878); Herman v. State, 73 Wis. 248, 41 N.W. 
171 (1888). 
11. Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1963); Hawaii v. Santos, 42 Hawaii 102 
(1957). 
12. See, e.g., DANISH CRIMINAL CODE OF 1958, §§ 222, 223; GERMAN PENAL CODE OF 
1871, § 182; FRENCH PENAL CODE OF 1957, § 65; NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE OF 1902, § 196 
(1961 amend.); SWEDISH PENAL CODE, Ch. 18, §§ 7, 8. 
13. See Mannheim, Mens Rea in German and English Criminal Law, 17 J. COMP. 
LEG. Se INT'L L. 82 (1935). See also Nelson, Sexual Offences and Sexual Off enders in 
Denmark; Andenaes, Norwegian Legislation and Practice Concerning Sexual Offences; 
0 
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criminal mental element has likewise been attacked.in England as in-
compatible with the basic requirements of dvilized and realistic 
jurisprudence. u One prominent English authority even urges that 
unreasonable mistake should be allowed as a defense, subject of 
course to the jury's rejection.15 Several eminent authorities in the 
Union of South Africa argue that unreasonable mistake does, in fact, 
already exist as a defense to statutory rape.16 
American text writers and commentators have generally been im-
pressed with the views of their European counterparts, notwithstand-
ing the near unanimity of American courts in rejecting those views. 
The most active and insistent American critic denounces the notion 
of strict liability in statutory rape as "anathema to the coherent devel-
opment of a rational criminal law,''17 and he feels that "it is obvious 
that sexual morality has overridden established principles of criminal 
law."18 Another noted authority has described this harsh rule as being 
"hideous" in its operation and effect.19 Indeed, American legal schol-
ars are almost unanimous in urging the adoption of at least reason-
able mistake of age as a defense.20 Thus, the draftsmen of the Model 
Penal Code have made reasonable mistake of age a specific defense to 
statutory rape and have emphasized in the comments that the Code's 
provisions for culpability make a "frontal attack" upon the notion of 
absolute liability.21 
Against this background of conflict, the first dramatic break-
through in the judicial treatment of statutory rape finally came in 
1964 in the case of People v. Hernandez.22 The defendant and the 
Rudholm, Swedish Legislation and Practice Concerning Sexual Offences, in SEXUAL 
OFFENCES (Cambridge Dept. of Criminal Science 1957). 
C 
14. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw 201-05 (2d ed. 1961). 
15. KENNY, CRIMINAL LAW 54 (18th ed. Turner 1962). 
16. DEWET AND SWANEPOEL, Dm SUIDAFRIKAANSE STRAFREG 129-30 (2d ed. 1960); 
Burchell, Unreasonable Mistake of Fact as a Defence in Criminal Law, 80 So • .AFluCAN 
L.J. 40 (1963). 
17. HALL, CRIMINAL LAw 304 (1947). See also Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 
23 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 422 (1958). 
18. CLARK &: MARsHALL, CRIMINAL LAw § 510 (6th ed. 1958); HALL, CRIMINAL LAW 
201-05, 366 (2d ed. 1960). 
19. MUELLER, LEGAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL CoNDUCI 37 (1961). 
20. MICHAEL &: WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND lTS ADMINISTRATION 756 (1940). Cf. 
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 127 (1957), apparently the Ione dissent among American com-
mentators. 
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); § 2.05, comments 
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
22. 61 Cal. 2d 529, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964). The significance of the 
decision is apparent from the attention it has received in the law reviews. See, e.g., 
17 A.LA. L. REv. 101 (1964); 14 CATH. U.L. REv. 123 (1965); 33 GEo. WASH. L. R:E.v. 
588; 53 GEO. L.J. 506 (1965); 78 HARv. L. R:E.v. 1257 (1965); 17 STAN. L. REv. 309 (1965); 
16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 148 (1964); 67 W. VA. L. REv. 149 (1965). It should also be noted 
that United States military courts hold that reasonable mistake as to whether consent 
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prosecutrix had been companions for several months prior to having 
consensual intercourse; at the time of the incident in question, the 
prosecutrix was a mere three months below the statutory age of 
consent.23 Defendant sought to introduce evidence to show that the 
prosecutrix had misled him into believing that she was over the 
requisite age, but the trial court rejected this evidence and convicted 
him of statutory rape. The California Supreme Court unanimously 
reversed the conviction and overruled sixty-eight years of precedent24 
by its holding that proof of the defendant's reasonable belief that the 
prosecutrix had reached the age of consent could form a sufficient 
basis upon which the trier of facts could find in the defendant's 
favor.25 
H emandez represents the first positive judicial step toward 
changing the irrational rules which currently control the crime of 
statutory rape, and its import should furnish a touchstone for the 
future development of the law of all sex crimes. In the brief period 
since the Hernandez decision was handed down it has been reaffirmed 
by its authors,26 and the legislatures in two other states have enacted 
statutes which embrace its sound reasoning.27 However, at least one 
state has evidenced an intent to follow the traditional judicial ap-
proach of imposing strict liability, notwithstanding the defendant's 
reasonable mistake with respect to the true age of the prosecutrix.28 
Thus, the following analysis is offered to encourage continued ac-
ceptance of the Hernandez rationale and, it is hoped, to forestall any 
further retrogression. 
had been obtained is a good defense to a charge of assault with intent to commit forci-
ble rape. United States v. Short, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 16 C.M.R. 11 (1954). See the U.S. 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL § 154 (3), at 295 (1951). 
23. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 261 sets the age of consent at eighteen. 
24. The decisions in People v. Griffin, 117 Cal. 583, 49 Pac. 711 (1897), and People 
v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896), were overruled. Similarly, People v. Sheffield, 
9 Cal. App. 130, 98 Pac. 67 (Ct. App. 1908), was disapproved to the extent that the 
decision is inconsistent with Hernandez. 
25. The defendant relied upon the general penal code provision that "there must 
exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence" to con• 
stitute the commission of a crime. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 20. He further relied upon a 
provision that one is not capable of committing a crime if the act in question was 
performed under ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent. 
CAL. PEN. CODE § 26. Thus, the sole issue on appeal focused upon the question of 
intent and knowledge entertained by the defendant at the time of the incident. 
26. See People v. Nigri, 232 Cal. App. 2d 419, 42 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1965), in which the 
prosecutrix had testified at the preliminary hearing that she had told ·the defendant 
she was eighteen. 
27. ILL. ANN. STAT, ch. 88, § ll-4(b)(l) (Smith-Hurd 1964); N. M. STAT, ANN, § 40A-9·8 
(Supp. 1964). . 
28. See State v. Ybarra, 386 S.W.2d 384, 886 (Mo. 1965): "It may be noted in passing 
that age is the essential element in statutory rape and intent and motive play but 
little if any part in the substantive offense" (quoting from State v. Baker, 276 S,W.J?d 
181 (Mo. 1955)). 
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II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT 
A. Historical Derivation of the Doctrine 
Anglo-American courts have traditionally held that in criminal 
cases "the mental is fundamental."29 Thus, the perpetrator of an 
othenvise criminal act will not be punished unless he has a so-called 
"guilty" or "criminal" mind.30 Under Roman law, dolus (evil intent) 
and culpa (negligence) were the subspecies of this criminal state of 
mind, and the maxim, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, was the 
outgrowth of an endeavor "to capture this theory of responsibility, 
resting upon and requiring concurrence of a wrongful intent and 
wrongful act."31 This early concept of mens rea, the guilty mind, 
expressed the principle that it is not anti-social conduct alone, but 
rather such conduct accompanied by certain mental states, which 
should concern the law. 
The maxim, ignoranti facti excusat (ignorance of fact excuses), 
represents a precept recognized at common law as a defense aimed at 
demonstrating a lack of mens rea. Basically this defense rests upon a 
belief in the existence of facts which, if they did exist, would render 
an act innocent. 82 Thus, since criminal intent is ordinarily of the 
essence of crime, if in any particular case this requisite intent is 
dependent upon knowledge of particular facts, an absence of such 
knowledge not resulting from carelessness or negligence relieves the 
act of criminality.83 
Sound legal theory similarly negates a conclusive presumption of 
criminal intent in statutory rape legislation. Under very early Eng-
lish common l~w, it was no crime to have consensual sexual relations 
with a female, regardless of her age. Only forcible rape was considered 
a crime. 84 It was not until the latter part of the thirteenth century 
that legislation was enacted making it unlawful in England to ravish 
29. Nord, The Mental Element in Crime, 37 U. DET. L.J. 671 (1960). 
30. CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 18, at 232; Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake 
in the Criminal Law, 22 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 75 (1908). 
31. Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). More recent Supreme Court 
decisions increasingly stress the need for the actor's mental awareness of his wrong 
before guilt can be imposed. See Robinson v. California, 372 U.S. 952 (1962). 
32. CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 18, at 288; Hall, Ignorance and Mistake 
in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1 (1957); Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. 
L. R.Ev. 1043 (1958); Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 
35 (1939); Woodruff, Mistake of Fact as a Defense, 63 DICK. L. R.Ev. 319 (1959). English 
courts have recognized mistake of fact as a defense in criminal prosecutions since 1638. 
Levitt's Case, reported in Cook's Case, Cro. Car. 537, 538, 79 Eng. Rep. 1063, 1064 
(K.B. 1639). 
33. Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308 (1875); State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513; 126 N.W. 
454 (1910). · 
34. 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES •210; 2 COKE, INSTITUTES •ISO. 
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"damsels" with or without their consent.35 This early statute avoided 
the incongruity of attaching the label "rape" to acts of consensual 
intercourse; instead, the proscribed conduct was more appropriately 
referred to as "unlawful carnal knowledge and abuse" of "any 
Maiden within Age," the age being twelve years or under.80 Toward 
the close of the sixteenth century, the age of consent was reduced to 
ten years.87 This latter statute also incorporated the language, "un-
la~ful carnal knowledge and abuse," and its purpose, like that of the 
earlier statute, was to declare that a girl under the prescribed age was 
conclusively presumed to be unable to consent since she was too 
young to understand the nature and quality of her act.38 
Throughout this development, however, it is important to bear in 
mind that there was no presumption eliminating the defense of mis-
take of fact or modifying the mens rea requirement.89 In fact, al-
. though mistake as to the age of an abduction victim was rejected in 
the landmark case of Regina v. Prince,40 reasonable mistake of age 
has never been denied as a defense in an English statutory rape case. 
Moreover, Prince was overruled by statute a scant ten years after 
rendition,41 and the statute currently in force in England expressly 
provides that mistake of fact is a defense in both abduction and 
statutory rape where the girl is over thirteen years of age and the 
man is under twenty-four and has not been previously charged with 
a like offense. 42 
B. Reaction of American Courts 
The English statute of 1576 which redefined the crime of statu-
tory rape has been held to be part of the common law originally 
brought to the United States.43 Even though all of the states have 
modified the original ten-year age of consent to a variety of ages from 
35. The crime commonly called statutory rape was created by the Statute of 
Westminister I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 34-(1275), which reduced the crime of rape to a trespass. 
The Statute of Westminister ill, 13 Edw. 1, c. 34 (1285), reinstated the crime of rape 
as a felony. 
36. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •212. 
37. The Common Informers Act, 18 Eliz., c. 7 (1576). 
38. People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896); State v. Burns, 82 Conn. 218, 
72 Atl. 1083 (1909); Golden v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 379, 158 S.W.2d 967 (1942): 
State v. Huntsman, 204 P .2d 448 (Utah 1949). 
39. See generally HAu., CRIMINAL I.Aw 287 n.27, 292-93, 339-41 (1947). 
40. L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875). In this celebrated case, defendant took an 
unmarried, underage girl from the possession of her father without his consent. 
Defendant's honest belief as to the girl's age, even though based upon reasonable 
grounds, did not relieve him from the consequences of his act. 
41. Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 &: 49 Viet., c. 69, §§ 5 (1)·(2), 
42. Sexual Offences Act, 1956, 4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69. 
43. Nider v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 684, 689, 131 S.W. 1024, 1026 (1910). 
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seven to twenty-one,44 the offense aimed at is virtually identical. 
However, despite adoption of the common-law statute, which was 
never held by English courts to deny the existence of reasonable mis-
take of fact as a defense, American courts have not allowed that de-
fense. They have instead accepted the denial of such a defense in 
Prince, an abduction case, and by analogy have extended it to statu-
tory rape.45 Despite having been soon overruled, Prince initiated a 
trend which was universally followed in American jurisdictions for 
the next eighty-nine years; statutory rape in America thus fell into a 
class of cases at variance with the reasonable-mistake-of-fact doctrine.46 
That American law has for so long constituted an exception to the 
general rule is an unjustified quirk of legal history; only Hernandez 
is in accord with the common-law notion of allowing a bona fide error 
in judgment. 
Prior to an examination of the factors indicating that American 
courts are operating without a sound foundation when they deny mis-
take of age as a defense to a charge of statutory rape, the following ob-
servation should be made. A state legislature has the power to define 
conduct as criminal, irrespective of guilty knowledge and no matter 
how sincere or reasonable the actor's mistaken belief may be.47 That 
is, the legislature may define a crime in such a manner as to make 
immaterial the existence or non-existence of a mental element;48 in 
crimes so defined, mistake of fact is no defense.49 In the specific area 
of statutory rape, a few legislatures have exercised this prerogative to 
impose strict liability upon an actor.50 In contrast, two other states 
have recently provided for mistake of age as a defense.51 In these 
jurisdictions there is no problem of construction-the courts simply 
follow the legislative mandate. 
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, however, the legislative pro-
44. MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 207(4), comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); seven years: 
one state; twelve years: two states; fourteen years: one state; sixteen years: twenty-three 
states; seventeen years: one state; eighteen years: twenty-one states; twenty-one years: 
one state. MUELLER, LEcAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL CONDUcr 74-80 (1961); MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 213.l(l)(d) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) retains the ten-year age of consent. 
However, this statute is supplemented by the Corruption of Minors and Seduction 
statute which proscribes intercourse with girls under sixteen if the male is at least 
four years older than the girl. Id. § 213.3. 
45. See notes 3-8 supra. 
46. See notes 4-8 supra. 
47. State v. Williams, 115 N.E.2d 36 (Ohio 1952). 
48. Smith v. State, 223 Ala. 346, 136 So. 270 (1931); In re Marley, 29 Cal. 2d 525, 
175 P.2d 832 (1946); State v. Weisberg, 74 Ohio App. 91, 55 N.E.2d 870 (1943). 
49. Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6 (1867); State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166, 
43 N.E. 163 (1896); Garver v. Territory, 5 Okla. 342, 49 Pac. 470 (1897). 
50. LA. REY. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (3) (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02-(9) (b) (1964); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.43 (1959). 
51. See note Zl supra and accompanying text. 
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hibitions against statutory rape are silent with respect to the question 
of mens rea; it is therefore necessary to turn to judicial rules of statu-
tory construction to ascertain the legislative intent. The ultimate ob-
jective is to determine whether the intention of the legislature was to 
make knowledge of the facts an essential element of the offense or, on 
the other hand, to put upon the actor the burden of finding out 
whether his contemplated act is prohibited. In making this determi-
nation, the general rule is that the court will consider the nature of 
the offense, the purpose to be accomplished by the statute, the prac-
tical methods available for the enforcement of the law, and any other 
relevant factors.52 
In statutes containing either a general mistake-of-fact section50 or 
a general penal code provision requiring the joint operation of act 
and intent, 54 it is easy for courts to infuse the requirement of in-
tent into all specific crimes not expressly prohibiting it.55 Where, 
however, there are no such general guidelines, more subtle principles 
of statutory construction must be called upon. Notwithstanding 
decades of American judicial construction to the contrary with re-
spect to statutory rape, the usual rule is that a statute restating a 
common-law crime should not be understood as having displaced a 
requirement of mens rea "unless the statute displacing it is, in its 
express words and necessary effect, plain and unequivocal."56 As 
stated previously, most American statutory rape laws are devoid of 
such express "displacing" language. 
When a statute dealing with a common-law crime is silent with 
respect to the actor's intent and if intent was an element of the crime 
at common law, as in the case of statutory rape, then the courts should 
assume that the common-law element of intent still exists.57 In 
52. See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896); 15 AM. JUR. 
Criminal Law § 306 (1938). 
53. CAL. PEN. CODE § 26(4); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18.201(4) (1947); MONT. REv. CODE 
.ANN. § 94.201(4) (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010 (1957); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12·02-1(5) 
(1959); OKLA. STAT. ,tit. 21, § 152(5) (1961); S.D. CoDE § 13.0201(5) (1939). The Wisconsin 
statute comes closest to stating this principle explicitly: "An honest error, whether 
of fact or law other than criminal law, is a defense if it negatives the existence of a 
state of mind essential to the crime." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.43 (1958). 
54. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 20. 
55. This is in fact the rationale of Hernandez. 
56. BISHOP, STATUTORY CRIMES 233 (1873). See also Armitage, Statutory Offence-A 
Presumption of Mens Rea, 1963 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 177; Endlich, Doctrine of Mens Rea, 
13 CRIM. LAw. MAc. 831 (1891); Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law Without It, 58 W. VA. 
L. REv. 35 (1955). See also 53 GEO. L.J. 506, 509 n.16 (1965): "It has been contended 
that the 'necessary effect' of -the statute requires the elimination of intent. See Sayre, 
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLUM. L. REV. 55, 74 (1933). Admittedly more statutory 
rapists would be punished by eliminating the element of intent from the crime, but 
if the 'necessary effect' of the statute required this, it would have been done long 
before 1875." 
57. State v. Bigelow, 76 Ariz. 13, 258 P.2d 409 (1953). 
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construing a statute defining an offense which contains no additional 
elements not found in the common-law definition, a court is bound 
by the construction which existed with reference to the common-law 
offense.68 The statutory rape laws have not created a new crime as a 
substitute for the common-law offense, so the general rules pertain-
ing to common-law offenses should prevail over all other rules of 
construction. Intercourse with an underage female was a common-
law felony, and, in the absence of legislative direction to the con-
trary, the courts must look to the common law for the description of 
the offense. 59 This suggestion is in keeping with the cardinal prin-
ciple that criminal statutes are always to be strictly construed in 
favor of the defendant. It would take little effort on the part of legis-
latures to carve out express exceptions to the common-law rule that 
mistake of fact is a defense; it is arguable that their failure to do so 
indicates an intention not to restrict the mistake-of-fact doctrine in 
this area. 60 
C. Public Welfare Offenses: An Excep"tion to tfze General Rule 
It must be noted in this regard that there is a certain class of 
crimes-public welfare offenses-which are generally considered not 
to require proof of mens rea. This is a group of police offenses and 
criminal nuisances which have been developing in England and 
America within the last century and which are punishable irrespec-
tive of the actor's state of mind. They include illegal sales of intoxi-
cating liquor, magazines, impure or adulterated food, and mis-
branded goods; narcotics act violations; violations of motor vehicle 
laws; and infractions of general police regulations designed to pro-
mote the safety, health or well-being of the community.61 .In the 
interpretation of these statutes, courts hold that if the legislature 
failed to include intent as an express element of the offense, then the 
legislature desired to dispense with the mental element, 62 especially 
if conviction does not result in great damage to reputation or severe 
punishment. 68 This widely accepted rule has long denied the defense 
of mistake of age in situations involving selling liquor to a minor, 64 
58. Ross v. State, 93 Pac. 299 (Ylyo. 1908). 
59. Warren v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W .2d 612 (Ky. 1952). 
60. The author does not of course overlook the counter-argument that the inaction 
of the legislatures may indicate "ratification" of the courts' action in imposing strict 
liability for statutory rape. ' 
61. See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLUM. L. REv. 55, 84 (1933). 
62. State v. Wojahn, 204 Ore. 84, 282 P .2d 675 (1955). 
63. Hall, Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law, 89 U. PA. L REv. 549, 568-69 
(1941). 
64. See Hershom v. People, 108 Colo. 43, 113 P .2d 680 (1941); State v. Lougiotis, 
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selling lewd magazines to a minor, 65 allowing minors on certain 
premises,66 and violating child labor laws.67 It is the actual and not 
the apparent age which governs culpability, and such merchants and 
employers are, in effect, insurers of the fact that the person with 
whom they are dealing has attained majority. 
However, the existence of strict liability in the public welfare 
offenses is not a persuasive argument in favor of strict liability for 
statutory rape. The underlying situations are not even analogous, 
because statutory rape cannot be considered a public welfare offense. 
In contrast to statutory rape, which descends from the common law, 
the public welfare offenses are new crimes, created solely by legisla-
tive enactments in the nature of police regulations. Moreover, these 
offenses are not strictly criminal, even though traditional criminal 
sanctions are relied upon, since the primary purpose of the legislature 
is neither punishment nor correction, but rather regulation. 68 In 
addition, there is actually no sound reason why public welfare 
offenses should be an exception to the general rules regarding reason-
able mistake of fact. Recognizing this, some legislatures have seen fit 
to include provisions expressly or impliedly making ignorance or 
good faith a defense.69 For this reason, new developments in the areas 
of the sale of liquor 70 and of magazines71 allow reasonable mistake of 
130 Conn. 372, 34 A.2d 777 (1943); Lavoie v. Committee of Law Enforcement, 87 Idaho 
536, 394 P.2d 300 (1965); State v. Dahnke, 244 Iowa 599, 57 N.W.2d 553 (1953): State 
v. Koliche, 143 Me. 281, 61 A.2d 115 (1948); State v. Holm, 201 Minn. 53, 275 N.W. 401 
(1937): State v. Paar, 129 Mont. 175, 283 P.2d 1086 (1955); Beverley Lanes v. Rohan, 
209 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1961); Ross's Dairies v. Rohan, 202 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1961); Sheibar v. 
Liquor Authority, 166 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1958); Hanewald v • .Board of Liquor Control, 101 
Ohio App. 375, 136 N.E.2d 77 (1957); State v • .Buttery, 95 Ohio App. 236, 118 N.E.2d 
548 (1953); State v. Kominis, 73 Ohio App. 204, 55 N.E.2d 344 (1943); State v. Raper, 
174 Ore. 252, 149 P.2d 165 (1944); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 
825 (1959); State v. Schull, 66 S.D. 102, 279 N.W. 241 (1938); Christ v. Kiltz, 232 Wis. 
567, 288 N.W. 175 (1939). 
65. See People v. Lida, 42 Misc. 2d 56, 247 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1964). 
66. See State v. Rosenfield, 111 Minn. 301, 126 N.W. 1068 (1910); People v. Voltana, 
231 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1962): Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959); 
City of West Allis v. Megna, 26 Wis. 2d 545, 133 N.W.2d 252 (1965). 
67. See Purtell v. Philadelphia &: R. Coal &: I. Co., 256 Ill. 110, 99 N.E. 899 (1912): 
Kendall v. State, 113 Ohio St. 111, 148 N.E. 367 (1925). 
68. See Sayre, supra note 61, at 72-75. 
69. People v. Averill, 179 'Mich. 224, 146 N.W. 189 (1914): Aultfather v. State, 4 
Ohio St. 467 (1855); Knoff v. Board of Liquor Control, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 563, 105 N.E,2d 
673 (1951); Suta v. Board of Liquor Control, 88 Ohio App. 88, 94 N.E,2d 464 (1950). 
70. See 5501 Hollywood, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic .Beverage Control, l!i5 
Cal. App. 2d 748, 318 P.2d 820 (1957); Trader Jon v. State .Beverage Dept., 119 So. 2d 
735 (Fla. App. 1960); Ross v. State, 116 Ind. 495, 19 N.E. 4!il (1888); People v • .Bronner, 
14!i Mich. 399, 108 N.W. 672 (1906); Laurino v. State, 81 N.J. Super. 220, 195 A.2d 
306 (1963); Appeal of D. &: R • .Beer Distributors, 6 Pa. D. & C. 2d 761 (Luzerne County 
Ct. 1955). 
71. See People v. Malinauskas, 110 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1952): A defendant charged with 
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fact as to the age of a minor. In these progressive jurisdictions, a 
seller may be exculpated if he can adequately demonstrate that he 
exercised due care in attempting to ascertain the age of the buyer 
before making the sale.72 · 
D. Offenses Involving Moral Turpitude: A Turning Point 
In addition to public welfare offenses, a second area of related 
crimes often cited by analogy to support strict liability in statutory 
rape is the group of sexual or marital offenses involving "moral 
turpitude." These statutory offenses, which have occasioned a 
thorough sifting of the question of the effect of ignorance or mistake 
of fact on criminal responsibility, include bigamy, adultery, abduc-
tion from parent or guardian of females under a certain age, or using 
such females for the purpose of prostitution, and conduct contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor. With regard to some of these, the 
courts have been greatly perplexed, and there is a conflict of authority 
in respect to several. Traditionally, several of these offenses have been 
regarded as exceptions to the mistake-of-fact doctrine. The primary 
components of this group are offenses such as adultery, bigamy, and · 
indecent acts committed upon underage children. Generally, the 
legislative intent has not been clearly expressed in defining these· 
crimes, and the courts have had to determine for themselves whether 
intent is a required element. Shortly after the tum of the century one 
court remarked: 
There appears to be no case decided by a competent tribunal, 
either in England or America ... in which the court did not hold 
that the knowledge of the age of the young girl abducted or 
defiled, or received or harbored for defilement or prostitution, 
did not constitute an element or ingredient of the offense. In-
variably, in such cases, it has been held that whoever committed 
the offense did it at his peril so far as the girl's age was concerned, 
selling liquor to minors could be convicted only if he sold to a minor who actually 
and apparently was under eighteen. The court distinguished this from statutory rape, 
which involves "dealing with one who is engaged in an act which is itself illicit, and 
not with one who is making a sale in the ordinary course of a legitimate business 
recognized and sanctioned as such by the state." See Dethfelson v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 145 Cal. App. 2d 561, 303 P.2d 7 (1956); State v. Fahey, 21 Del. (5 Penne.) 585, 65 
Atl. 260 (1904); Cohen v. Schott, 48 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1950); Fehn v. State, 3 Ind. App. 
568, 29 N.E. 1137 (1891). 
72. See Reich v. State, 63 Ga. 616 (1879); Thibodeaux v. Sulphur, 140 So. 2d 49 
(La. Ct. App. 1962); People v. Welch, 71 Mich. 548, 39 N.W. 747 (1888); Rochenstein's 
License, 19 Pa. Dist. 710 (1909); Feldman v. Tax. Comm'n, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 
(1943); Liquor Control Bd. v. Duvall, 170 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943); Smith 
v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 259, 115 S.W.2d 412 (1938); State v. Constantine, 43 Wash. 102, 
86 Pac. 384 (19?6). 
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and that ignorance or mistake in respect to her age would con-
stitute no defense .... 78 
Admittedly, there is much subsequent authority in favor of strict 
liability. For example, most courts consider that a woman's remar-
riage within seven years of her husband's disappearance is bigamous 
if he is still alive, even though her belief that he was dead is reason-
able and well-founded.74 Similarly, mistaken belief in the existence of 
a divorce has traditionally not been regarded as a defense.711 These 
holdings are based primarily on the principle of statutory construc-
tion that since the legislature has fixed certain exemptions from a 
prosecution for bigamy, the courts cannot extend them to persons 
and situations not expressly exempted. 
While this is still the majority view in this country, its in-
fluence is dwindling, and there is an increasing movement away 
from strict liability. Ever since the leading English case of Regina v. 
Tolson16 held that a wife's honest and well-founded mistake of fact 
constituted a valid defense to a bigamy charge, an increasing number 
of American courts have taken the position that a mistaken belief in 
the death of the first spouse, 77 or belief in the validity of a divorce not 
in fact obtained,78 constitutes a valid defense to bigamy. Even though 
bigamy was not a crime at common law,79 these courts have neverthe-
less construed the statutes so that one is not guilty of bigamy if he 
has a bona fide and reasonable belief that facts existed that left him 
free to remarry. 80 Similarly, although the customary view has been 
that the defendant's ignorance of the fact that the other party was 
married is no defense to a prosecution for adultery,81 several courts 
73. Brown v. State, 23 Del. (7 Penne.) 159, 165, 74 Atl. 836, 838 (1909), 
74. See Alexander v. United States, 136. F.2d 783, 784 (D.C. Cir, 1943); State v. 
Henke, 58 Iowa 457, 12 N.W, 477 (1882); Rose v. Rose, 274 Ky. 208, 118 S.W.2d li29 
(1938); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 23 (1865); Commonwealth v. 
Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844). 
75. See Ellison v. State, 100 Fla. 736, 129 So. 887 (1930); People v. Spoor, 235 Ill, 
230, 85 N.E. 207 (1908): Braun v. State, 230 Md. 82, 185 A.2d 905 (1962); State v, 
Trainer, 232 Mo. 240, 134 S.W. 528 (1948); Duncan v. State, 23 Okla. Crim, 321, 214 Pac. 
937 (1923); Manahan v. State, 188 Tenn. 394, 219 S.W .2d 900 (1910); State v, Hendrick• 
son, 67 Utah 15, 245 Pac. 375 (1926); Rex v. Wheat, [1921] 2 K.B. 119 (CCA). 
76. 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889). 
77. See Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949): Bruton v. State, 100 Fla, 189, 
129 So. 339 (1930); State v. DeMeo, 20 N.J. 1, 118 A.2d 1 (1955); Hainis v. State, 16 Ohio 
C.C.R. (n.s.) 443, 31 Ohio C.C. Dec. 619 (1906). 
78. See People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956): Robinson v. State, 6 Ga, 
App. 696, 65 S.E. 792 (1909): Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459 (1874); State v. Cain, 106 La, 
708, 31 So. 300 (1902): Chapman v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 591, 179 S.W. li70 (1915): Jones 
v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 152, 165 S.W. 144 (1914). 
79. See State v. Sellers, 140 S.C. 66, 134 S.E. 873 (1926). 
80. See People v:Palmer, 35 Cal. Rptr. 476 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963): Reed v. State, 148 
Tex. Crim. 409, 187 S.W .2d 660 (1945). . 
81. See Commonwealth v. Elwell, 4S Mass. (2 Met.) 190 (1840): People v. Hess, 286 
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have more recently held intent to be a necessary element of this 
crime.82 When one person in good faith marries another believing 
the other to be unmarried, it is likewise not per se adultery.83 Thus, 
in these jurisdictions the mere specification of certain defenses in 
bigamy and adultery statutes does not exclude the additional defense 
of mistake of fact. 84 
The judicial treatment of abduction cases is somewhat more com-
plex. As mentioned above, an early English decision held that a male 
had to take his chances with respect to a girl's age-if he made a mis-
take, he had to bear the consequences.85 This doctrine, although sub-
sequently overruled in England,86 had already taken root in the 
United States.87 Some statutory definitions specified a maximum age 
for the victim; in the absence of any express provision as to age, 
statutes were construed to require that the girl be under twenty-one.88 
Although the defense -of mistake of age has not even been raised in 
an abduction case for almost half a century, generally where a partic-
ular fact, such as age, is an element of this crime, it is no defense that 
the perpetrator was unaware of the existence of that fact.89 The essen-
tial criminal intent is deemed included in the mere doing of the pro-
hibited act.90 · 
Where the statute requires knowledge by the accused of the 
female's age, however, this knowledge is an essential element of the 
offense.91 Even in the absence of such legislative direction, several 
courts have allowed as a defense the honest belief that the girl was 
over the statutory age.92 The juries in these cases have been permitted 
App. Div. 617, 141 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1955); State v. Cutshall, 109 N.C. 550, 14 S.E. 107 
(1891); Commissioner v. Dolph, 164 Pa. Super. 415 (1949). 
82. See San Chez v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 2d 146, 314 P.2d 135 (1957); 
People v. Lipski, 328 Mich. 194, 43 N.W.2d 325 (1950); Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 
156 A.2d 537 (1959). 
83. See Harmon v. Harmon, 245 N.C. 83, 95 S.E.2d 355 (1956). 
84. See Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949). Cf. Sayre, The Present Signifi-
cation of Mens Rea in the Criminal LalJ!, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYS 399, 413 (1934). 
85. Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875). 
86. See note 41 supra and accompanying text. 
87. See State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447 (1859); BISHOP, STATUTORY CRIMES § 632 (3d ed. 
1901). 
88. See Boyett v. State, 130 Ala. 77, 30 So. 475 (1900); Whaley v. State, 187 Tenn. 
507, 216 S.W.2d 17 (1948). 
89. See People v. Dolan, 96 Cal. 315, 31 Pac. 107 (1892); People v. Fowler, 88 Cal. 
136, 25 Pac. 1110 (1891) (now in doubt due to Hernandez); State v. Jones, 16 Kan. 608 
(1876); Howell v. Commissioner, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 174, 12 Ky. Op. 199 (1883); Riley v. 
State, 18 So. 117 (Miss. 1895); State v. Baldwin, 214 Mo. 290, 113 S.W. 1123 (1908); 
People v. Stott, 4 N.Y. Crim. 306, aff'd, 5 N.Y. Crim. 61 (1886); Lopez v. State, 70 Tex. 
Crim. 71, 156 S.W. 217 (1913). 
90. State v. Locoshus, 96 N.H. 76, 70 A.2d 203 (1950). 
91. See Herman v. State, 73 Wis. 248, 41 N.W. 171 (1888). 
92. See, e.g:, State v. Suennen, 36 Idaho 219, 209 Pac. 1072 (1922); People v. Ragone, 
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to arrive at the apparent age of the female by a consideration of her 
appearance and other relevant evidence.93 Thus, these courts uphold 
the common-law presumption that mens rea is a prerequisite to guilt, 
unless the particular statute involved has either expressly or by neces-
sary implication dispensed with this basic requirement. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the weight of authority in 
recent cases involving the charge of contributing to the delinquency 
of .a minor favors allowance of the defense of reasonable mistake of 
age. Although a few courts are still of the opinion that such statutes 
make the act criminal irrespective of guilty knowledge,94 the trend is 
definitely toward exculpating the defendant who can show that the 
offense took place under a misconception as to the minor's true age.0G 
This trend, coupled with the aforementioned weakening of strict 
liability in other related areas, seems to point -toward a serious re-
appraisal by forward-looking courts of the merits of strict liability in 
areas in which the doctrine has been regarded as impregnable.96 The 
law has been presumed settled in these areas for decades, but the 
mistake-of-age defense may be revitalized shortly in many states in 
various situations to which it has traditionally been held inapplicable. 
Several courts have recently moved away from imposition of criminal 
sanctions in the absence of culpability where the governing statute 
expresses no legislative intent or policy to be served by imposing strict 
liability. If a legislature desires to eliminate intent as an element of a 
particular crime, it is no great burden to demand that this purpose 
be expressly stated in the statute. In contrast, however, it is a great 
burden upon defendants for courts not to read in a requirement of 
mens rea when the legislature has failed to express its wishes. It is 
only logical to conclude, as did the court in Hernandez, that "in the 
54 App. Div. 498, 15 N.Y. Crim. 192, 67 N.Y. Supp. 23 (1900); Mason v. State, 29 Tex, 
Civ. App. 24, l4 S.W. 71 (1890). 
93. See People v. Ragone, supra note 92. 
94. See State v. Klueber, 132 N.W .2d 847 (S.D. 1965), where knowledge that the 
child was under fifteen years of age was held not to be an essential element of the 
offense of indecent molestation. The court stated the following theory: "It is to be 
noted that in defining the crime our legislature did not prescribe that it was necessary 
to the offense that the act be committed knowingly. When the word knowingly is 
omitted in the statutory specification of a public offense, and no words of similar 
import are used, good faith is unimportant and the absence of criminal intent is no 
excuse.'' Id. at 848. See also Hanewald v. Board of Liquor Control, 101 Ohio App. 
375, 136 N.E.2d 77 (1957); Birdsell v. State, 205 Tenn. 631, 330 S.W.2d 1 (1959). 
95. See People v. Eurard, 55 III. App. 2d 270, 204 N.E.2d 777 (1965); People v. 
Bailey, 341 Mich. 592, 67 N.W .2d 785 (1954); McGowan v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 310, 
176 P.2d 837 (1947); Baxter v. State, 363 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Crim. 1963). 
96. Hernandez, for example, is just another in a series of recent California dedsions 
eliminating areas of strict responsibility in felonies. See People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 
167, 302 P.2d 5 (1956); People v. Winston, 46 Cal. 2d 151, 293 P.2d 40 (1956). 
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absence of a legislative direction otherwise, a charge of statutory rape 
is defensible wherein a criminal intent is lacking."97 This is simply a 
logical extension of the mistake-of-fact doctrine into an area in which 
it has always rightly belonged. 
III. RELATIVE CULPABILITY OF DEFENDANT AND PROSECUTRIX 
Because of supposed policy reasons, the "wrongdoer" has tradi-
tionally been required to assume the risk of his actions in statutory 
rape. In order to effectuate the basic purpose of preventing the 
victimization of immaturity, he has been held to have acted at his 
peril, even when the girl's sexual sophistication should contradict 
the law's presumption.98 This conclusive presumption of non-consent 
in underage girls is customarily rationalized in terms of their lack of 
capacity to understand the nature and implication of the sexual act.99 
It is thought necessary for the protection of the immature female, and 
society in general, that the defendant assume the risk of committing 
the crime of rape if the girl is in fact under the statutory age.100 
Certainly, no one can doubt the soundness of the "victimization of 
immaturity" justification, which assumes that it is in the public 
interest to protect the sexually naive female from physical, emotional, 
and psychological exploitation. No responsible person would hesitate 
to condemn as untenable a claimed good faith belief in the attain-
ment of age of consent by an "infant" female whose obviously tender 
years preclude the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief. 
Societal interests still require the protection of young girls from phy-
sical harm;101 and regulation of the abnormality known as pedophilia 
97. 61 Cal. 2d at 536, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 365, 393 P.2d at 677. 
98. The girl's consent to the act is deemed immaterial because she "is without 
capacity and discretion to have a proper conception of the character of the offense .•• 
or to comprehend its consequences fully, or perhaps to possess the strength of will to 
resist .••. " Golden v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 379, 383, 158 S.W.2d 967, 969 (1942). See 
People v. Courtney, 180 Cal. App. 2d 61, 4 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1960); MODEL PENAL CoDE 
§ 207.4, comment at 251-53 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
99. Golden v. Commonwealth, supra note 98; State v. Adkins, 106 W. Va. 658, 146 
S.E. 732 (19~9); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, comment at 251-53 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 
1955). 
100. "The object and pur.pose of the law are too plain to need comment, the crime 
too infamous to bear discussion. The protection of society, of the family, and of the 
infant, demand that one who has carnal intercourse under such circumstances shall 
do so in peril of the facts, and he will not be heard against the evidence to urge his 
belief that the victim of his outrage had passed the period which would make his act a 
crime." People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896). See Miller v. State, 16 Ala. App. 
534, 79 So. 314 (1918); Holton v. State, 28 Fla. 303, 9 So. 716 (1891); Parsons v. Parker, 
160 Va. 810, 170 S.E. 1 (1933). 
101. PLoscowE, SEX AND THE I.Aw 184 (1951): "The exposure to sexual experience 
represents a real threat to the life of the child. Anyone who tampers sexually with a 
young child is potentially a killer and hence a dangerous individual outside prison 
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-an adult male's proclivity for sex relations with children-is well• 
founded.102 The crucial object of protection is, of course, the infant, 
and the American courts' enthusiasm to promote this goal is quite 
evident: 
It matters nothing that this girl was forward .... [T]he statute 
was enacted to protect just such girls as this one from their own 
folly. The legislature has said, in effect, of the adolescent girl 
under 16 years: "The brook has not yet met the river. She is 
merely a child-a child perplexed at the disquiet of puberty; 
confused by emotions she cannot fathom, and unable to com-
prehend the significance of those emotions to her own being, or 
their relation to society. She is incapable of consenting to the 
desecration of her incipient womanhood." The statute makes 
her sexual profanation a ravishment, even though invited. It has 
therefore erected a barrier of years around wilful girlhood-a 
barrier across which the profligate proceeds at his peril.103 
A. Unrealistically High Ages of Consent 
In their zeal to protect immature girls, the legislatures have, with 
a few exceptions, raised the original common-law age of consent from 
twelve to sixteen, eighteen, and even twenty-one.104 However, the 
courts have not correspondingly altered their attitudes. Judicial deci-
sions are still ·written as if the courts were in all cases condemning 
pedophilia and protecting a naive girl under twelve years of age, 
although this is usually an inaccurate description of a statutory 
rape case.105 Indeed, the issue raised in Hernandez directly ques-
tioned the applicability of the increased age of consent statutes to 
situations where a young man seduces a technically underage girl 
who is hardly describable as "infantile." There is great danger in 
assuming that immaturity can be accurately determined solely by 
calendar age. The thrust of the Hernandez opinion is its implicit 
recognition of the potential harshness of imposing strict liability 
upon a young man when the age of consent is sixteen or above and 
the girl has become a young woman.106 This recognition is well-
walls." But cf. SEX OFFENDERS 81-82: "The great majority of offenders against children 
(under age 12) were not physically dangerous since they did not use force and since 
-they seldom attempted coitus." 
102. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, comment at 251 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
103. State v. Adkins, 106 W. Va. 658, 663, 146 S.E. 7.32 (1929). 
101. See note 44 supra. 
105. See generally SEX OFFENDERS 81-82. 
106. "In fact, the customary dividing line at age twenty-one is in direct conflict 
with .the ideals of sexual desirability in our culture-note how many Miss Americas 
and Miss Universes are legally minors. We say in effect, 'Here are the most beautiful 
and desirable girls, but you must leave them alone until .they reach their twenty-first 
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founded, for it is clear that the policy of protecting underage girls 
applies with less force as the age limits are raised. 
In our culture, the separation of females-into taboo and non-taboo 
categories ~:m the basis of an arbitrary age, usually in the late teens, 
has little relationship to physical or emotional maturity. To be sure, 
there are many girls between the ages of twelve and fifteen who are 
so obviously immature in physique, dress, and deportment that they 
would be approached only by a person psychologically disturbed or 
coming from a subculture where the acceptable age-range is lower 
than the usual level in the United States. However, there are even 
more girls from twelve to fifteen whose appearance and behavior 
place them within, or on the vague border of, the average male's 
category of desirable females.107 By the middle teens, most girls are 
sufficiently developed physically and are sufficiently aware of social 
attitudes for a man to have to use considerable force or some definite 
threat if the girl objects to sexual contact. Thus, "heterosexual 
offenders against minors" include adult males convicted of sexual 
contact, ·without force or threat, with females aged twelve to fifteen 
who are not their daughters. The great majority of these girls, how-
ever, are sexually mature and biologically ready for coitus.1°8 "The 
vague duress and domination seen in child-adult relationships is here 
minimal: the girl knows that an adult's desires are not unquestion-
able; she knows that in rejecting a sexual advance society is on her 
side."109 
Intercourse with a girl who is in her middle to late teens lacks the 
qualities of abnormality and physical danger that are present when 
she is still a child.110 The physical-harm argument is inherently 
weakened by modern marriage laws which sanction middle-teen 
marriagesm and by the number of girls who actually get married by 
the time they are sixteen.112 It is clear that the element of "victimiza-
year.'" Id. at 83. In overruling People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896), the 
Hernandez court emphasized that the original purpose of statutory rape statutes was 
literally to protect "infants," and- that when Ratz was decided, the age of consent was 
fourteen, rather than the current eighteen in California. In criticizing the interpreta-
tions of -modem statutes where the age limits are generally sixteen to twenty-one, 
the court quotes and emphasizes PLoscowE, SEX AND THE LAW 185 (1951): ",TJie statute 
is interpreted as if it were protecting children under the age of ten." 39 Cal. 2d at 364 
n.3, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 534 n.3, 393 P .2d at 676 n.3. 
107. SEX OFFENDERS 84. 
108. Id. at 83. 
109. Id. at 85. . 
110. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, comment at 252 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); 
PLoscoWE, op. cit. supra note 106, at 184-85. 
111. Most states allow girls sixteen or over to marry with their parents' consent and 
allow girls under sixteen to marry upon obtaining a court order. 
112. According to the 1950 census, six per cent of the females in the United States are 
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tion" decreases as the girl grows older and more sophisticated. In 
brief, by the middle teens most girls have reached a point of maturity 
which realistically enables them to give meaningful, although not 
legal, consent. 
B. Victims or Instigators? 
Not only are teen-age girls capable of giving operative consent; 
the increasing sexual awareness and promiscuity currently evident at 
lower ages enhances the probability that sexual experimentation will 
be indulged in, and many times actively solicited by, the girl. "There 
are sexually promiscuous young girls in every neighborhood of a city 
whose favors can be bought by any boy or man for a pittance,"118 
and the amateur counterparts to these young professionals are even 
more numerous.114 Thus, it becomes readily apparent that the law's 
assumption that age alone brings an understanding of the sexual act 
to a young woman is of doubtful validity. The existence of this 
situation was apparent to the Hernandez court and was well illus-
trated by its observation that: 
Both learning from the cultural group of which she is a member 
and her actual sexual experiences will determine her level of 
comprehension. The sexually experienced 15-year-old may be 
far more acutely aware of the implications of sexual intercourse 
than her sheltered country cousin who is beyond the age of 
consent. A girl who belongs to a group whose members indulge 
in sexual intercourse at an early age is likely to rapidly acquire 
an insight into the rewards and penalties of sexual indulgence.11ti 
Just as the number of promiscuous girls has increased, so also has 
the burden increased upon young men to judge accurately a girl's 
true age. 
With the great emphasis our culture places upon feminine 
beauty (a euphemism for sexual attractiveness), the omnipresent 
pressure of advertising, and the breakdown of age distinctions 
in dress and cosmetics, it has become increasingly difficult to 
judge accurately a young girl's age. Moreover, girls in the twelve-
married by age sixteen. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES CENSUS OF 
POPULATION FOR 1950, Special Reports: Marital Status, table 5, p. 42 (1953), 
113. PLoscoWE, op. cit. supra note 106, at 181. 
114. The Kinsey Institute surveyed 110 cases where both the official version and 
the offender's version were in agreement concerning the circumstances of the offense 
against girls thirteen to sixteen: "[B]oth agree ,that in 99 instances the girl did not 
discourage ,the sexual activity. This understatement conceals the fact that an undeter-
mined number of girls actively encouraged it. • •• Who reported the sexual behavior 
to the authorities? The girl herself rarely did so directly. Usually .the situation was 
discovered by friends or relatives who thereupon reported it." SEX OFFENDERS 100·01. 
115. 61 Cal. 2d at 531, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 362, 393 P .2d at 674. 
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to fifteen-year bracket are often ashamed of their youth and wish 
to give the impression of being older and more sophisticated 
than they really are.116 
Such feelings can readily lead to deliberately deceptive practices.117 
The modem use of cosmetics enables the young girl to mask her age 
with what is literally a disguise, and in this she will frequ~ntly have 
the approval, or at least the tacit permission, of her parents. Un-
fortunately, if proceedings are subsequently undertaken against a 
man, the parents usually see to it that their daughter's appearance is 
radically altered for the trial.118 
C. Minimal Deterrent Value 
Studies have shown that recidivism among statutory rapists is 
almost nonexistent because the offenders are usually adolescent boys 
who, as they grow older, will normally be interested in older girls 
their own age.119 Intercourse is primarily limited to partners whose 
ages differ little, since the major basis of induction into such activity 
is the peer society itself and not seduction by adults.120 
116. SEX OFFENDERS 83. , 
117. "Deception is easy, particularly when the male involved is a victim of wishful 
thinking. For the sake of the prestige and material benefits to be derived from as-
sociating with an older man some girls will do everything in their power to convey 
the impression that they are 'of age,' or at least old enough to be reasonably 'safe.' 
To be regretfully but firmly rejected as 'jailbait' or 'San Quentin quail' is an experience 
that girls in this hypersensitive phase of life find extraordinarily humiliating." Id. at 
83-84. 
118. Id. at 84. The Kinsey Institute proceeds to cite a somewhat humorous, but 
partially pathetic, story of one such calculated risk induced by deception: "His sexual 
partner he had known only as a good-looking girl given to heavy cosmetics, high heels, 
tight dresses, and provocative mannerisms. After she demonstrated a propensity for 
drink and sexual banter, he followed the anticipated sequence of events, finding her 
experienced and moderately satisfactory. When he saw her, on the witness stand in 
court, his hopes of leaving the room a free man collapsed abruptly. 'I knew I was done. 
for,' he stated, 'when I saw they braided her hair in pigtails and had given her a rag 
doll to hold.'" Ibid. 
119. DONNELY, GOLDSTEIN&: SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 245-46 (1962). 
120. Reiss, Sex Offenses-The Marginal Status of the Adolescent, 25 LAw &: CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 309, 325 (1960). The Kinsey Institute classifies the great bulk of offenders of 
girls thirteen to sixteen into two varieties-subculture offenders and near-peer offenders. 
"The subculture offenders are those who belong to a portion of society, a subculture, 
which regards as a suitable sexual object any female past menarche, or even a 
prepubescent female if she is of adult size •••• The near-peer offenders are simply 
males who are so close in age to their 'victims' that a sexual relationship is psycho-
logically and socially appropriate although illegal. A classic case is that of a seventeen-
year-old boy and a fifteen-year-old girl. In prison, where the boy was serving six months 
for statutory rape, the psychologist described him as 'an embarrassed male of seventeen 
who had intercourse with a girl fifteen. He says she offered no protest and he thought 
there would be no legal complications. • • • [His] social group fully approved of 
such a pastime procedure. Much fault seems to rest in the willingness of the girls .•• .' " 
SEX OFFENDERS 102-03. Of the offenders against girls thirteen to sixteen which the Kinsey 
Institute surveyed, "for roughly four fifths of them this was their first sex offense: 
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Such conclusions tend to dispel the argument that absolute pro-
hibition of statutory rape has a deterrent effect upon such activities. 
The assumption has long been that the knowledge that others were 
punished will promote a conscious re-evaluation by a potential of-
fender. The reasoning underlying this assumption is that if some 
young man who is inclined to such conduct does know the law as 
it is now held to be, he may say to himself: "I believe the girl to be 
over the age of consent; but if she is in fact under that age I may be 
punished; it is not worth the risk." To this extent, absolute prohibi-
tion may deter a few potential offenders, but statistics indicate that 
the alleged deterrent effect of the strict liability statutes is minimal 
and does not markedly reduce seductions of underage girls by boys 
in their peer group, especially when the activity is a mutual under-
taking.121 "Legislators have been blithely unaware of the limitations 
of the penal law in deterring the expression of as deeply rooted a 
drive as sex when they set the ramparts of rape around the sexual 
intercourse of grown girls and young women."122 The argument that 
the pursuit of females who appear to be over sixteen betokens no 
abnormality has fallen on deaf judicial ears in all cases except 
Hernandez, where the defense counsel successfully urged: 
Surely, in the face of the problems faced by our young men, 
society should not impose upon [Hernandez] the burden of 
acting at his peril when he seeks to satisfy a normal biological 
urge, second only to that of self-preservation, with a female he 
reasonably believes to be over the age of consent.123 
D. Distorted Public Images 
Closely related to this argument is the popular misconception as 
to the nature of the statutory rapist-perhaps the major reason 
behind legislative retention of statutory rape laws. Few criminals are 
regarded with greater fear and contempt, or dealt with more harshly 
by the law, than the forcible rapist. The frightening public image of 
the forcible child rapist-a grotesque, perverted, lurking monster124-
a ratio in keeping with the concept of these offenders as 'ordinary men' who were 
careless in the matter of age. This same idea is reinforced by the data concerning 
psychosis and neurosis: 2 per cent had a history of mental or emotional illness." Id, 
at 100. 
121. SEX OFFENDERS 100. 
122. PLoscowE, op. cit. supra note 106, at 193. 
123. Brief for appellant, p. 27. 
124. See Storr, Child Rapist, in NEW STATESMAN, July 7, 1961. Sec also PLoscowE, 
op. cit. supra note 106, at 178. Since 1958 forcible rapes have increased thirty per cent, 
and forty per cent of the forcible rapes in the United States in 1964 were committed 
by males under twenty-one years of age. F.B.I., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES for 1964, 9, Ill (1965). 
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carries over unjustifiably to indict the statutory rapist on the same 
grounds. In reality, however, the statutory rapist is quite generally 
found to be a normal young man, 125 and research evidence shows that 
in most cases he is not a rapist in any sense that coercion was 
used, since most such acts occur through common consent.126 It has 
been indeed unfortunate for the development of the law of statutory 
rape that the public so often views the statutory rapist with the same 
revulsion as the forcible rapist. 
E. Summation 
These observations serve as background for the basic criticism of 
statutory rape laws: to maintain absolute prohibition involves punish-
ing the unlucky ones who turn out to be wrong, while letting 
go free those who happen to be right. This, in brief, "offends the 
sense of justice."127 It often involves the automatic punishment of 
innocent boys128 who may, in fact, have been enticed by the most 
seductive of young women.129 Nevertheless, even in circumstances 
125. "[S]tatutory rapists often are quite normal young men who have coital rela-
tions with slightly under-aged girls. Many of these men are ignorant of the law, or 
of the girl's true age, at ·the time of committing their offense • • • • [T]hose convicted 
of statutory rape are more sexually and psychiatrically normal individuals whose 
offenses are partly an offshoot of their general anti-social patterns." Wheeler, Sex 
Offenses-A Sociological Critique, 25 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 258, 275 n.68 (1960). In 
1964 the proportion of young persons arrested for non-forcible sex offenses, including 
statutory rape, rose, with persons under eighteen accounting for tlventy-four per cent 
of these arrests as compared to tlventy-one per cent in 1963. F.B.I. REPORT, op. cit. 
supra note 124, at 10. 
See also CALIF. LEcIS., PRELIMINARY REPORT OF nm SUBCOMMITrEE ON SEX CRIMES 27, 
105 (1950): "At some time or another 95 per cent of the male population commits a 
sex offense for which he might be prosecuted •••• [I]f you pass a law which is going 
to make such a crime one for which they can be committed for life, if the law is 
effectively enforced, you can put 50 per cent of the males of your population into 
penal institutions." 
126. Reiss, supra note 120, at 314. 
127. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw 158 (2d ed. 1961). 
128. "While the offender against minors is unusually prone to rationalize his be-
havior by stressing the adult appearance of his partner, it is not uncommon to find 
they were truly unaware of the girl's real age. Still others lulled their suspicions by 
deciding (often with good reason) that the girl was so experienced that her chrono-
logical age could be safely ignored. Men often labor under the delusion that a partic-
ular girl's promiscuity and notoriety somehow exempt them from the dictates of 
society regarding age. An understanding policeman may take such mitigating circum-
stances into account, but in a court there is often no mitigation. A drunken man 
seduced by a fifteen-year-old prostitute will learn to his dismay that his condition and 
the girl's profession do not shield him from the charge of contributing to a delinquency 
of a minor or of statutory rape." SEX OFFENDERS 84. 
129. "There are not a few soberminded fathers and mothers who feel ,that the 
statute is more drastic than sound policy requires .• · .• It is too ,true that many imma-
ture boys do not ·have the moral fiber and discretion of a Joseph. A lecherous woman 
is a social menace; she is more dangerous than T.N.T.; more deadly than 'the pestilence 
that walketh in darkness or the destruction that wasteth at noonday.'" State v. Snow, 
252 S.W. 629, 632 (Mo. 1923). · 
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where the girl's actual comprehension contradicts the law's presump• 
tion, the male is deemed criminally responsible for the act, although 
he may be young and naive and merely responding to advances. The 
extreme and manifestly unjust consequences to which this may lead 
are graphically illustrated in a case where the "victim" and "vic-
timizer" were reversed: 
We have in this case a condition and not a theory. This ·wretched 
girl was young in years but old in sin and shame. A number of 
callow youths, of othenvise blameless lives ... , fell upon her 
seductive influence. They :flocked about her ... like moths about 
the :flame of a lighted candle and probably with the same result. 
The girl was a common prostitute ... the boys were immature 
and doubtless more sinned against than sinning. They did not 
defile the girl. . . . Why should the boys, misled by her, be 
sacrificed? Might it not be wise to engraft an exception in the 
statute?130 
When a girl acquires a great amount of sexual experience at 
an early age, it is difficult to justify the law's assumption that the male 
is always responsible for the act.131 In this type of situation, funda-
mental notions of justice greatly overbalance the public policy of 
protection of young females. In the effort to provide a maximum 
protection for young girls, regardless of their maturity, the law has 
frequently worked an injustice by disallowing the defense of reason-
able mistake of age. "The girl's participation, her intellectual and 
emotional status-these are of small consequence. Society's age-
grading hierarchy has been affronted and someone must be served up 
as a propitiatory sacrifice."132 
Nevertheless, strict liability has traditionally been imposed in all 
statutory rape cases, and the resulting penalties may be harsh indeed. 
England has relatively light penalties, imposing a maximum of life 
imprisonment only for intercourse with girls under thirteen and 
reducing the maximum to two years if the girl is between thirteen 
and sixteen.133 The least stringent penalty imposed by any state in 
the United States is that of Ohio, which specifies one to twenty 
years.134 Several states have a much more onerous system, with the 
possibility of death or life imprisonment.185 Fortunately, some states 
130. Ibid. 
131. Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape-An Exploration of the Operation and 
Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 65, 82 (1952). 
132. SEX OFFENDERS 106. 
133. Sexual Offences Act, 1956, 4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, § 6(3). 
134. Omo R.Ev. CoDE .ANN. § 2105.03 (Page 1954). 
135. See generally Tappan, Sexual Offences and the Treatment of Sexual Off enders 
in the United States, in SEXUAL OFFENCES 500-02 (Cambridge Dept. of Criminal Science 
1957). 
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have provided the jurors and the trial judge with a considerable 
amount of latitude in the determination of punishment.136 Even if 
this discretion results in a nominal penalty, however, this is not a 
sufficient safeguard because the stigma of conviction for even the 
misdemeanor of "rape" is likely to be more serious and perm~ent 
than for many felony convictions; of course, the court is powerless to 
mitigate this effect. · 
Nevertheless, Hernandez is the only case in which a court has 
given meaningful consideration to these factors. Instead of shielding 
a knowledgeable girl who was only three months beneath the age of 
consent, the court dealt with statutory rape as a joint enterprise. 
Noting the similarity between the legislative treatment of bigamy 
and statutory rape, the court approved the reasoning of an earlier 
California decision: 
The severe penalty imposed ... , the serious loss of reputation 
conviction entails ... , and the fact that it has been regarded for 
centuries as a crime involving moral turpitude, make it ex-
tremely unlikely that the Legislature meant to include the 
morally innocent to make sure the guilty did not escape.137 
IV. THE "LESSER LEGAL WRONG" AND "MORAL WRONG" THEORIES 
A. Lesser Legal Wrong Theory-Strict Limitations on Scope 
The basis propounded by many courts to support strict liability is 
that if in some general way the actor had a guilty mind as to his 
conduct, such as knowledge that he was committing an act of fornica-
tion, it is assumed that he had a criminal intent sufficient to justify 
his conviction of an unintended criminal act, including one with a 
greater punishment, because the mistake went to the degree of ·wrong 
rather than to the presence of wrong. 
However, the foundation of this "lesser legal wrong" theory in 
statutory rape cases is totally wiped out where fornication is no longer 
criminal. Ten states have no fornication statutes,188 and many others 
proscribe it only if it is "continual," "open and notorious," or 
both.139 In addition, even where fornication is still technically a 
136. Evidence of the girl's declarations as to her age has frequently been admitted 
to show mitigating circumstances and thus to help the court decide whether the 
offense was a felony or a misdemeanor. See, e.g., People v. Pantages, 212 Cal. 237, 297 
Pac. 890 (1931); Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (1910); People v. Marks, 146 
App. Div. 11, 130 N.Y.S. 524 (1911); Sprague v. State, 243 Wis. 456, 10 N.W .2d 109 (1943). 
137. 61 Cal. 2d at 535,,39 Cal. Rptr. at 365, 393 P.2d at 677 (quoting from People 
v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P .2d 850 (1956)). 
138. Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington. 
1!19. See MonEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
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crime, the "legal" wrong that the accused might have supposed he 
was committing is one that is to a great extent ignored or even con-
doned by both society and the courts. Laws punishing illicit cohabita-
tion or fornication are generally unenforced.140 
B. Moral Wrong Theory-Absence of Definitive Standards 
Even if an act is not illegal, some courts have held that the mere 
intent to do an immoral act supplies the requisite mens rea when an 
unintended criminal act results.141 The basis for this conclusion is 
that acts which allegedly involve moral turpitude are revolting to the 
better instincts of the community and are universally recognized to be 
a serious ·wrong not only to the individual, but also to society. The 
chief attraction of this view lies in the practicality of equating mens 
rea with knowledge of moral reprobation. Since the relevance of the 
precise age of the girl is a legal technicality and does not affect the 
morality of the matter, mistake as to age, it is claimed, should not be 
a defense. "Basically, you take ... the statute and say that it describes 
a legal-moral wrong. You then say that the specification of the girl's 
age, although part of the technical legal wrong, is not part of the 
legal-moral wrong; consequently no knowledge of it is required."142 
This reasoning is subject to question, since it is obvious that there 
are varying degrees of morality.143 It must be recognized that different 
individuals and groups in a heterogeneous community have widely 
divergent opinions with respect to the morality of extra-marital inter-
course. Although certain groups, and perhaps the law itself, may 
judge such conduct to be wrong, it may be in complete conformity 
with the standards of the actors' peer group. Thus, in many cases the 
imposition of statutory rape penalties does not serve to protect, but is 
only an attempt to maintain debatable standards-standards which 
re.fleet as vague a norm as the community ethic.144 What two mature 
people do sexually in private should not be governed by statute.1411 
140. PLoscowE, op. dt. supra note 106, at 155. 
141. People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896), appears to be the first case in 
any jurisdiction to hold directly that "immorality" alone is enough for conviction. 
Hernandez directly overrules ,this case and its rationale. For other decisions which 
rely on the moral-wrong theory, see People v. Fowler, 88 Cal. 136, 25 Pac. 1110 (1891); 
State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447 (1859): Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875); 
1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAw § 247 (1st ed. 1850) (first statement of the rule). 
142. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL I.Aw 190 (2d ed. 1961). 
143. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, comment (Tent, Draft No. 4, 1955). 
144. The American Law Institute states: .. ,ve deem it inappropriate for the govern• 
mcnt to attempt to control behavior that has no substantial significance except as to 
the morality of the actor." MoDEL PENAL CODE § 207, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
145. "The advisability of punishing as rape an act which may or may not be con-
sidered as immoral by the peer groups of the actor is highly questionable. Behavior 
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Hernandez knocks out the moral-wrong justification and brings 
the law into line with sound legal theory. The court, in drawing 
upon its comment in the prior case of People v. Vogel146 that a bona 
fide and reasonable belief by the accused that he was single could not 
be translated into a criminal intent to commit bigamy, stated: "Cer-
tainly it cannot be a greater wrong to entertain a bona fide but 
erroneous belief that a valid consent to an act of sexual intercourse 
has been obtained."147 The court intimated that extra-marital inter-
course is amoral or, at least, not immoral in any culpable degree. 
To disregard ·the immorality argument is to remove one of the 
fundamental reasons for applying strict liability to statutory rape. It 
is an abrupt departure from traditional authority, but nevertheless 
fits squarely within the trend of thinking set by modem behavioral 
scientists.148 Hernandez thus broadened the requirement of mens rea 
in statutory rape by refusing to derive criminal intent from immoral 
intent and by questioning the very immorality of such intent itself. 
Why, indeed, should one's knowledge that he is committing some 
moral ·wrong ( or lesser legal ·wrong) make him guilty of the crime of 
statutory rape? That legal responsibility in this degree should auto-
matically follow is a non sequitur. · 
C. Piecemeal Attempts at Correction 
Rejection of the lesser-legal-wrong and moral-wrong doctrines is 
only in keeping with the current attitude of the public, which has 
been gradually eroding imposition of strict liability for years. Recog-
nition of the injustice traditionally thrust upon the male has resulted 
in the tempering of statutory rape laws through the inclusion of 
various piecemeal provisos. Thus, the severity of t,!ie punishment 
that has no substantial significance except to the morality of the parties involved is 
best left to the control of the religious, education and social influences." MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 207.1, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
146. 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956). 
147. 61 Cal. 2d at 535, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 365, 393 P.2d at 667. The court compared 
the reasonable mistake of fact defense in statutory rape to the same defense in bigamy 
cases. One commentator has noted in this regard: "[I]n these two cases, if the facts 
conform to ·the defendant's reasonable belief, the moral implication of their conduct 
would be distinctly different, since a defendant convicted of bigamy has sexual rela-
tions in the marital state, whereas a defendant convicted of statutory rape has extra• 
marital intercourse-.presumably an immoral act. Thus, at most the Hernandez court 
fails to confirm the immorality of extramarital intercourse; at least, it refuses to imply 
criminal intent from immoral conduct." 53 GEO. L.J. 506, 510 (1965). · 
148. DRUMMOND, THE SEX PARADOX (1953); FORD & BEACH, PATIERNS OF SEXUAL BE-
HAVIOR 197 (1952); KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 
264, 389-93 (1948); MURDOCK, SOCIAL STRUCTURE 265 (1949); PLoSCOWE, op. dt. supra, 
note 106, at 184-85; MuRDOCK, A Comparative Anthropological Approach, 36 J. SOCIAL 
HYGIENE 133, 137 (1950). 
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may be dependent on the age of the boy140 or on the age160 or want 
of prior chastity151 of the girl. Similarly, legislation has been enacted 
which recognizes mistake of age as a mitigating factor,152 but only two 
states have recently allowed mistake to exculpate entirely.158 Finally, 
the jury may be vested with discretion to recommend that statutory 
rape be punished as a misdemeanor rather than as a felony.164 All of 
these measures are obvious legislative attempts to soften the effect of 
an arbitrary rule. 
In addition to the legislative inroads, there is a growing public 
recognition that it is unfair to characterize many adolescent sex 
experimentation cases as felonious rape. There is an awareness that 
control of heterosexual sex offenses against girls in the age group 
from sixteen to twenty-one is a singularly difficult problem, primarily 
because society is caught in a contradiction: 
[I]t is difficult to find logic in our culture vis-a-vis adult hetero-
sexuality. On one hand we stress and encourage the development 
of heterosexual behavior-the literature, the advertisements, the 
movies, everything relentlessly dins in the, order: be sexually 
attractive, find romance, get a mate! On the other hand we strive 
to prevent heterosexuality, in any situation other than legal 
marriage. We tread on the accelerator and the brake simul-
taneously; this may result in the desired speed, but it is rough 
on the mechanism. If early marriage were feasible for everyone, 
our position would be more tenable, but our complex civiliza-
tion demands that marriage be delayed.155 
As a girl increases in age after sixteen, the rationale for punishing 
her partner in voluntary sexual behavior tends to evaporate. "Ob-
viously there is a great difference in terms of illegality, immorality and 
actual guilt between a relatively innocuous intercourse on the one 
hand and a heinous incestual relationship or rape-like intercourse on 
149. See, e.g., .ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 399 (1958); N.J. REv. STAT. 2A:138-l (1951); Sexual 
Offences Act, 1956, 4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, § 6(3). Under the MODEL PENAL CODE § 213,3 (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962), consensual sexual intercourse with a female between the 
ages of ten and sixteen is not termed rape, but rather is covered in a separate section 
entitled "Corruption of Minors and Seduction." 
150. MINN. STAT. § 617.02 (1961). 
151. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 435.100 (1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2359 (Supp. 1962); 
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. L, § 4721 (1936); WASH. REv. CODE§ 9.79.020 (Supp. 1961); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 5930 (1961). 
152. CAL. PEN. CODE § 264. Indeed, the trial court in Hernande:& did receive such 
evidence to show mitigation and put the accused on probation for two years. 
153. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § ll-4(b)(l) (Smith-Hurd 1964): "to prevent the know-
ing and deliberate victimization of the young" (Emphasis added); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40A-9-3 (Supp. 1964). 
154. See CAL. PEN. CoDE § 264. 
155. SEX OFFENDERS 108, 
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the other."156 For this reason, the good sense of courts, prosecutors, 
and juries has often mitigated the deficiencies of statutes governing 
statutory rape.1117 English judges criticized such legislation before the 
1956 Sexual Offences Act as being both a "grotesque state of affairs" 
and "amazing legislation," and correspondingly imposed relatively 
nominal punishment.158 Similarly, American grand juries frequently 
refuse to indict youngsters whose only crime was that their love-
making took no account of the limitations of the calendar or of penal 
statutes.159 
Yet, despite this evident tendency to mitigate the harshness of the 
statutory rape laws, there can be no escape from the necessity of 
revising such statutes or substituting a more reliable remedy. It may 
be hoped that a judge would regard reasonable mistake as excusing 
from punishment, if not from conviction, but there is obviously no 
certainty of this. "The reactions of judges, administrative officials and 
jurymen vary from county to county with respect to the different 
aspects of the problem of rape."160 The policy to be pursu~d should 
find expression in the legal texts which are guides to official action 
rather than being left to the caprices and attitudes of varying groups 
of officials. It is submitted that the policy should be one which views 
the potential injustice to young males as far outweighing the alleged 
affront to society's moral standards. 
As a practical matter, there has not been as large an organized 
demand for change made upon state legislatures as one might antici~ 
pate. Unless there is an unusual social disturbance, there are seldom 
any complaints filed or charges made in cases which would fall within 
the statutory rape laws. In the absence of some compelling reason to 
prosecute, all parties normally consider their interests best served by 
avoiding the unwelcome publicity that would attend a trial. This 
does not, however, justify the continued ~xistence of such conven-
tional statutes if their application can even occasionally lead to unjust 
results. The Hernandez court manifested its recognition of this situa-
tion by refusing to derive criminal intent from alleged immoral 
intent and by declining to presume conclusively that the defendant 
had mens rea. 
156. MUELLER, LEcAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL CONDUcr 74-80 (1961). 
157. PLoscowE, op. cit. supra note 106, at 179, 190. 
158. Williams, op. cit. supra note 142, at 154 n.15. The following example appeared 
in Bijou, The Times (London), March 3, 1959: A Jamaican laborer had intercourse 
with a girl who was just under sixteen, but who told- him that she was over sixteen 
and who looked and behaved as though she were. The trial judge passed a sentence 
of nine months' imprisonment; fortunately the C.C.A. intervened. 
159. MUELLER, op. cit. supra note 156, at 74-80; PLoscoWE, op. cit. supra note 106, at 
190. 
160. PLoscowE, op. cit. supra note 106, at 191. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Legislative 
I. Classification of Females by Age 
[Vol. 64:105 
Three legislative changes would conform the law of statutory rape 
to realistic standards. First, the age requirements should be changed 
so that offenses fit into either of two distinct categories: (1) where the 
female is less than thirteen years old and (2) where the female is 
thirteen through fifteen years of age. 
Absolute liability would still be imposed where the girl is not yet 
thirteen years old. This imposition of strict liability is realistic be-
cause it is in this period of pre-puberty and initial puberty that the 
girl is just gaining the physical capacity to engage in intercourse, but 
remains. seriously deficient in comprehension of the social, psy-
chological, emotional, and physical significance of sexuality.161 It is 
still realistic to regard her as "victimized" because very few girls enter 
the period of sexual awakening before the thirteenth year.162 
In the second category, the defense of reasonable mistake of fact 
would be allowed unless the male were more than four years older 
than the girl.163 In this period of middle to later adolescence, the 
chief significance of such behavior lies in its contravention not of 
physical standards, but rather of the moral standards of the commu-
nity. If the girl looks and acts as if she were sixteen or older, and 
especially if she lies concerning her minority, intercourse with her 
will no longer automatically be deemed a rape. Thus, whether she is 
a day or a year below age sixteen, a teenage boy would no longer act 
at his peril if he had a reasonable belief that she was over fifteen 
when she consented to the act.164 This approach would give full cre-
dence to a realistic age dichotomy when the man is genuinely mis-
taken. 
Finally, consensual intercourse with females sixteen and older 
should not be branded as rape. When a girl is sixteen, she has become 
a young woman, and the consensual act loses its quality of ab-
normality, heinousness, and physical danger to her. The Kinsey Insti-
tute has formulated a persuasive list of reasons for the establishment 
of the sixteenth birthday as the beginning of adult life: 
161. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, comments (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
162. PLoscoWE, op. cit. supra note 106, at 184. 
163. See text accompanying note 169 infra. 
164. See Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape-An Exploration of the operation 
and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 54, 82 (1952); text accompanying 
note 169 infra. 
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I. The average sixteen-year-old is biologically adult. She has 
attained the basic physique which will be hers the rest of her life 
even though it may be altered by additional adipose tissue and 
ultimately by the deteriorations of age. She is sexually mature, 
being capable of conceiving and bearing children; she is physi-
cally as capable of sexual response as she ever will be, though this 
capacity may be masked by inexperience and inhibition. Her 
strength and motor coordination are sufficient to meet the needs 
of adult life. She has developed the secondary sexual character-
istics that all peoples regard as the distinguishing features of 
adult females. Throughout human history the majority of the 
societies of the world have regarded the sixteen-year-old as physi-
cally eligible for an adult sexual life.165 · 
2. From a social point of view the average sixteen-year-old has 
at least a basic knowledge of the behavior that society expects 
from adults, and sufficient motivation and control to conform to 
this expectation. Her IQ will not be significantly altered with 
passing years-her judgment may improve and her fund of 
knowledge increase, but she has fully developed her funda-
mental intellectual equipment. Until this century, when we 
artificially protracted childhood, the sixteen-year-old female was 
considered sufficiently mature, intellectually and emotionally, to 
function as an adult member of society.166 
3. [Many] professional scholars have also used age sixteen as the · 
critical dividing point, and note that this is the demarcation age 
in compulsory school attendance, and is also recognized as a turn-
ing point in child labor laws.167 
To be sure, there are many girls over six.teen who are not sufficiently 
mature to engage in consensual sexual activities. However, if in fact 
we are to permit sexual activity only among the emotionally and 
intellectually mature, we should logically withhold permission from 
vast numbers of individuals aged beyond the magic numeral "twenty-
one:•1as 
2. Limitation on Age Differentials 
As a second measure designed to prevent automatic punishment 
of relatively innocent adolescent sex experimentation, but still in 
165. SEX OFFENDERS 106. 
166. Id. at 107. 
167. Id. at 108. 
168. Id. at 107. Cf. Ploscowe, Sex Offenses-The American Legal Context, 25 LAw 
&: CoNTEMP. PROB. 217, 222 (1960): "It is absurd in our culture, however, to talk of 
young women of middle and late adolescence not having knowledge and appreciation of 
the sexual act. Such knowledge is usually acquired by the time of puberty. The law 
should, accordingly, take a more realistic view and fix the age of consent at fourteen 
years, instead of the higher limits that are more commonly found. Should the legislator 
wish to protect the morals of young women over fourteen years of age, this can be 
done by means other than branding as a rapist every male who may dally with them." 
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keeping with the effectuation of the victimization-of-immaturity 
rationale, legislatures should require a substantial age differential be• 
nveen male and female before imposing strict liability. Recent 
English legislation and the Model Penal Code require a four year 
differential in age before the defense of mistake is excluded.100 This 
would avoid the harsh and unreasonable automatic application ·of 
the "rape" label to sex experimentation where the girl is just under, 
and the boy just over, the age of consent. 
\ 
3. Definite Standards of Culpability 
Finally, legislatures should deal directly with the problem of 
degrees of culpability by expressly adopting provisions substantially 
identical to those in the Model Penal Code. Legislative treatment of 
such matters in the United States has been "relatively sparse and 
often indeterminate in meaning."170 In contrast, however, the Code, 
following the lead of the European penal codes, has now articulated 
an integrated set of principles addressed to the pervasive problems 
concerning mens rea. The Code proposes four concepts to describe 
tp.e kinds of culpability which are sufficient to establish liability: 
purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.171 However, since 
to a large extent "the answer rests with the judges and not with the 
draftsmen, the Model Penal Code does not resolve the problem but 
it does radically reduce its dimensions by stating certain rules which 
are more specific and helpful than any which have been [previously] 
formulated in this country."172 If legislatures choose to act in this 
area, they could deal directly with mens rea problems by expressly 
providing that if negligence is mentioned in the statute, it will suffice 
to impose liability. In all other cases, intention would be necessary 
for culpability. The mental elements in crime would thus be articu-
lated by the use of general categories--assumptions upon which the 
whole penal code could rest unless it were clear that the legislature 
had carved out an exception. This would be a major step forward in 
169. Sexual Offences Act, 1956, 4 &: 5 Eliz. 2, § 6; MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962). For an exhaustive discussion of this point, see EAsT, SEXUAL 
OFFENDERS 15 (1955); ELLIS &: BRANCALE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX OFFENDERS 15-21 
(1956); SEX OFFENDERS 106-08; THE DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER 7 (Madow ed. 1963); 
Frankel, Psychiatric Characteristics of Sex Offenders (Trenton: New Jersey, 1950), 
mimeo., p. 2; Revitch &: Weiss, The Pedophiliac Offender, 23 DISEASES OF nlE NERVOUS 
SYSTEM 73 (1962). 
170. See Wechsler, On Culpability and Crime-The Treatment of Mens Rea in the 
Model Penal Code, 339 Annals 24 (1962). See also Remington & Helstad, The Mental 
Element in Crime-A Legislative Problem, 1952 W1S. L. REv, 644. 
171. MonEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
172. Preveser, English Criminal Law Reform and Pre-American Model Penal Code, 
in CURRENT LEGAL !'ROBLD!S 62 (1958). ' 
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telling judges what the requirements of the specific offense should be. 
It would free judges from current doubts and promote consistent 
statutory construction-if the legislation does not make express ex-
ception to the otherwise uniform requirement of mens rea, then the 
courts would assume that they are to read in this element. 
B. Judicial 
If the legislatures fail to provide remedial measures in this area, 
the cour.ts themselves, as in Hernandez, should take the initiative and 
bring their decisions into line with social realities by recognizing the 
defense of reasonable mistake of age. They should recognize that 
bona fide errors in judgment as to the age of girls can be made by 
young men and boys who are no more dangerous than other persons 
on a similar social, educational, and economic level. This recognition 
would then allow the courts to cease interpreting statutory rape laws 
as if they were protecting children under the age of ten. The courts 
should have the courage to return to the early and well-established 
principles of strict construction and the presumed requirement of 
mens rea when interpreting statutory rape legislation. This would 
give full credence to a realistic jurisprudence when the man is 
genuinely mistaken. It should be noted in this regard that the 
Hernandez court based its decision on the lack of specific legislative 
direction removing the mental element from the crime of statutory 
rape. The court declared that the legislature must expressly direct 
any departure from the traditional necessity of mens rea; since the 
legislature had not done so in the California statutory rape provi-
sions, the court concluded that it was still a prerequisite to criminal 
responsibility. 
The courts in England and America should also change from the 
traditional concept of mens rea to the "half-way house" concept 
which makes a proscribed act still punishable, though to a lesser 
degree, if the actor's conduct was based upon a mistake which was 
the result of negligence. The ideal law in this area would permit 
consideration of mistake of fact as a defense to intentional crimes: 
(I) if unreasonable, the mistake would be regarded as negligence; 
(2) if reasonable, the mistake would acquit altogether. Such judicial 
interpretation would' eliminate the problem that Anglo-American 
courts have had during the past hundred years in dealing with statu-
tory offenses-a feeling that they had to punish even though there 
was no guilty element as far as intention or knowledge was concerned. 
They have failed to see that negligence, with its concomitant reason-
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able-man standard, is a way to deal with the problem of culpability 
lying between criminal intent and strict liability. 
In short, if legislation does not make express exception to the 
mens rea requirement in an offense, then the courts should assume 
that they are to read in this test. In doing so, they should also consider 
the different degrees of mens rea: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, 
or negligence, according to the actor's state of mind. This judicial 
supplementation of statutes would reverse the current, harsh imposi-
tion of strict liability in the face of legislative silence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Judicial responsibility is long overdue in exposing statutory rape 
laws as an "ethereal structure of fictions"173 which for so long has 
artificially protracted American childhood. The California Supreme 
Court should be given great credit for its courage in casting aside the 
dogmatic thinking which has obscured the law of sex crimes. It 
overruled decades of precedent to give judicial sanction to a sound, 
increasingly prevalent public belief-that the crime of statutory rape 
is unsupportable in its present form and that neither public senti-
ment nor the policies underlying the law warrant culturally con-
structed barriers or the imposition of harsh rape penalties solely 
because of a teenage girl's youth. 
The opinion underscores the belie£ that, in our culture, the per-
missibility of a given type of sexual behavior should not depend 
solely upon the age of the participants, but rather upon the elastic 
concept of maturity. This decision represents a substantial judicial 
advancement which, in the absence of specific legislative direction to 
the contrary, should be extended to all Anglo-American jurisdictions 
in statutory rape and related areas. Such a course of positive action 
would lead to greater public respect for, and confidence in, the 
administration of a system of justice that does not turn a blind eye 
to the individual facts of each case or to the presumption of each 
man's innocence. 
173. 53 GEO. L.J. 506, 512 (1965). 
